Supply network disruption and resilience: A network structural perspective by Kim, Yusoon et al.
Journal of Operations Management 33–34 (2015) 43–59
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal  of  Operations  Management
j  o ur na l ho mepage: www.elsev ier .com/ locate / jom
Supply  network  disruption  and  resilience:
A  network  structural  perspective
Yusoon  Kim a,b,∗, Yi-Su  Chenb,c, Kevin  Lindermanb,d
a College of Business, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR 97331, United States
b Center for Supply Networks, Arizona State University, Phoenix, AZ  85004, United States
c Department of Management Studies, College of Business, University of Michigan—Dearborn, 19000 Hubbard Drive, FCS 184, Dearborn, MI 48126,
United States
d Department of Supply Chain and Operations Management, Carlson School of Management, University of  Minnesota, 321 19th Avenue South, Minneapolis,
MN  54545, United States
a  r  t  i  c  l  e  i  n f  o
Article history:
Received 10 January 2014
Received in revised form 1 August 2014
Accepted 16 October 2014
Available online 27  October 2014
Keywords:
Supply network disruption
Resilience
Graph theory
Complex networks
Network analysis
a b  s  t  r a  c t
Increasingly,  scholars  recognize  the  importance  of understanding supply network disruptions. However,
the  literature still lacks  a clear  conceptualization  of a network-level  understanding  of supply  disruptions.
Not  having  a network  level  understanding  of supply disruptions  prevents  firms  from  fully  mitigating  the
negative effects  of a supply disruption.  Graph  theory helps to  conceptualize  a supply  network  and  dif-
ferentiate between disruptions  at  the  node/arc  level  vs. network  level.  The structure  of a  supply  network
consists  of a collection  of nodes (facilities)  and  the  connecting arcs (transportation).  From  this perspective,
small events  that  disrupt  a  node or  arc in the  network can  have  major  consequences  for  the  network.  A
failure  in a node or  arc can  potentially  stop the  flow of material  across network. This  study  conceptualizes
supply  network  disruption  and resilience  by  examining  the  structural  relationships  among entities in the
network.  We compare  four fundamental  supply network  structures  to help understand  supply  network
disruption  and resilience.  The analysis  shows that node/arc-level  disruptions  do not  necessarily  lead  to
network-level disruptions,  and demonstrates  the  importance  of differentiating  a node/arc  disruption vs.
a  network disruption.  The results  also  indicate  that  network  structure  significantly  determines the  like-
lihood of disruption.  In  general, different structural relationships among  network  entities have  different
levels of resilience.  More  specifically,  resilience improves  when the  structural  relationships  in a  network
follow  the  power-law.  This  paper not only  offers  a new  perspective  of supply network  disruption, but  also
suggests  a useful analytical  approach to assessing  supply network  structures  for  resilience.
© 2014  Elsevier B.V.  All  rights  reserved.
1. Introduction
Hendricks and Singhal (2005) found that an announcement of
a supply disruption lowers a  firm’s stock returns on average by
20% six months after the announcement. Recent industry examples
highlight the challenges that companies face in recovering from a
disruption. For instance, Toyota had a  supply network disruption
in the aftermath of the 2011 tsunami in Japan. Six months later,
Toyota had to idle some plants in  North America due to shortage
of parts (Ferreira, 2012). Some tsunami-stricken Japanese suppliers
could no longer supply the North American plants, which shut them
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down. Several other examples have been documented, where sup-
ply disruptions in one part of the world created problems in another
part of the world. One of the authors of this study worked with a
multinational personal computer (PC) maker in the wake of the
2011 floods in Thailand, which then led to a  disruption of the com-
puter hard-disk industry. As the PC  manufacturer executives were
investigating their supply network, they became concerned about
how a  supplier “deep in the supply network” might disrupt their
operations. In  an increasingly globally connected world, managing
supply disruptions involves more than just preventing disruptions
at your facilities. It  also requires a broader understanding of  the
overall structure of your supply network.
Many scholars have begun to study supply chain disruptions.
These studies have largely focused on assessing vulnerabilities that
firms face and/or capabilities they need to  manage these vulnerabil-
ities (Ellis et al., 2010; Sheffi, 2007). However, in many cases, supply
disruptions (i.e., stoppages of material flows) do not originate from
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jom.2014.10.006
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a  focal firm’s facilities, but rather from its supply network. Also,
disruptions at the local level do  not  necessarily lead to  network-
level disruptions. Consequently, a  firm’s failure to manage supply
disruptions often stems from a lack of understanding of the sup-
ply network. Nonetheless, few studies to date have  examined how
the overall structure of a  supply network can affect disruption
risks. In addition, research has not offered a  formal definition of
a supply network disruption. As a  result, empirical research cannot
fully progress in this area. This study defines a  supply network dis-
ruption and takes a  network structural perspective to address the
following questions: how does the supply network structure influence
disruptions, and how can one assess the resilience of supple network
structure?
From a structural perspective, a  supply network can be viewed
as a collection of nodes (facilities) and arcs (transportation linking
facilities) (Borgatti and Li, 2009). A supply disruption thus depends
on the structure of the nodes and arcs in  the supply network. A dis-
ruption of a node or  an arc sometimes has little overall effect, but
other times can bring down the entire supply network—such as the
Thailand floods did for the PC industry. Understanding the overall
supply network structure and differentiating between node/arc-
level and network-level disruptions can help better manage supply
disruptions. Drawing on graph theory, this paper advances a more
precise definition of supply network disruption. The definition has
implications for  how to understand and manage supply disruptions
at the network level. An analysis of basic supply network structures
demonstrates that the structure of the nodes and arcs in a  supply
network strongly determines its risk of disruption and resilience. In
particular, a supply network will become more resilient when the
overall structure of the nodes and arcs follow a power-law distribu-
tion. Consequently, firms will benefit from a  deeper understanding
of supply network structure and how it influences disruption risk
and resilience at  the network-level.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
the literature on supply network disruption and resilience. Section
3 draws on graph theory to conceptualize a supply network, dis-
ruption, and resilience. Section 4 develops the four basic supply
network structures based on the literature and compares these
structures on network resilience. Section 5 advances proposi-
tions about the connection between supply network structure and
resilience. Finally, Section 6 discusses the implications of this study
for research and practice.
2. Literature on supply network disruption and resilience
The literature has taken various perspectives on examining sup-
ply disruptions and resilience, including behavioral (e.g., Ellis et al.,
2010; Wagner and Neshat, 2010), conceptual (e.g., Christopher and
Peck, 2004; Kovács and Tatham, 2009; Tang, 2006), qualitative (e.g.,
Craighead et al., 2007; Jüttner et al., 2003; Sheffi and Rice, 2005),
and simulation/modeling (e.g., Nair and Vidal, 2011; Wu et al.,
2007; Zhao et al., 2011). For instance, Ellis et al. (2010) used a
survey to study how firms make decisions in the face of supply dis-
ruptions. Christopher and Peck (2004) offered a conceptual model
to classify some sources of supply chain risks and suggest how
to overcome those risks. Craighead et al. (2007) employed struc-
tured interviews and critical incident technique to understand why
disruption severity varies among supply chains. Wu et al. (2007)
utilized a modeling approach to understand the propagation of
disruptions across supply chain systems. In terms of the level of
analysis, the literature also varies from the firm level, to the supply
chain, to the supply network. Although this research has produced
useful insights from a range of different perspectives, it has also
led to confusion—especially when it comes to the level of analysis.
Consequently, the literature uses different terms and concepts to
define and assess supply network level disruptions and resilience.
In the literature, a  supply network disruption is generally
defined as an unplanned and unanticipated event that disrupts the
normal flow of goods and materials in a supply network (Craighead
et al., 2007; Hendricks and Singhal, 2003; Kleindorfer and Saad,
2005; Svensson, 2000),  and viewed as a major source of firms’ oper-
ational and financial risks (Stauffer, 2003). This definition, while
offering a general description, does not clearly specify the level
at which the disruption occurs and the scope of its effect. This
becomes an important distinction since the cause and effect may
occur at different levels. The Toyota example serves as a  case in
point—a disruption occurred in  a  component plant in  Japan (a cause
at the node-level), which led to a  shutdown in their North American
truck production (the effect at the supply network-level). Failure to
make this distinction has implications for how we understand and
manage disruptions.
The concept of network resilience also has important implica-
tions in  understanding supply network disruptions (Sheffi, 2007).
However, the literature gives no clear consensus on the definition
of resilience in  the context of supply network disruptions. Table 1
summarizes existing definitions, measures, and levels of analysis of
the supply network disruption and resilience. The literature does
not provide a  clear formal definition of supply network resilience.
Some define it as a  property (Longo and Oren, 2008), while others
describe it as a  capability of the supply network (Christopher and
Peck, 2004). Still others view resilience as both an inherent prop-
erty (to absorb shock) and an ability to  adapt to changes (Johnson
et al., 2013). Furthermore, although scholars have treated the term
“disruption” as a  companion concept to resilience (Scholten et al.,
2014), in many cases they do  not formally define “disruption”
and assume that it is  clearly understood. Ambiguous definitions
can lead to confusion and impede scholarly development (Wacker,
2004).
In  addition, not clarifying the level of analysis when defining
and theorizing about supply network disruptions exacerbates the
problem. The literature shows inconsistencies and ambiguity when
it comes to the level of analysis. This becomes problematic since the
behavior of a network emerges from its elements. For example, Wu
et al. (2007) described a  supply chain disruption as a “disruption
at a  susceptible location in  the supply chain” (p. 1677, emphasis
added), which indicates a  disruption as defined at the node level.
The authors then took a network perspective in  their analysis to
show how far-reaching the effect of a  disruption can propagate
across a  supply chain. Consequently, there is  a  disconnect between
the conceptual definition (at the node level) and analysis (at the net-
work level). Similarly, Craighead et al. (2007) defined supply chain
disruptions as “unplanned and unanticipated events that disrupt
the normal flow of goods and materials.” Then, they proposed the
node criticality notion to  refer to the importance of a  node within
a  supply chain and describe it as what eventually determines the
severity of a supply chain-wide disruption. The assumption is  that
a  disruption at a critical node invariably leads to a system-wide
disruption via cumulating serious consequences across the entire
supply chain. Their definition of supply chain disruption does not
clarify or distinguish its cause and effect, leading to inconsistency in
the level of focus between definition and analysis. Although these
papers advanced our understanding of supply disruptions, at the
same time, they lacked clarity.
According to  Wacker (2004),  a good (operational) definition
should be “a concise, clear verbal expression of a  unique concept
that can be used for strict empirical testing” (p. 631). Nonetheless,
few studies (except for Sheffi and Rice, 2005; Zhao et al., 2011)
have offered a clear definition at the supply network level, let
alone analytical measures. Further, much of the research is  qual-
itative in  nature, largely relying on event or case studies (with
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Table 1
Existing research on supply network disruption and resilience.
Referencesa Definition Level of definition and
analysis
Methods/nature of
study
Main findings
Conceptual definition Operational measuresb
Jüttner et al. (2003) • Disruption
(vulnerability) as “the
propensity of risk
sources and risk
drivers to outweigh
risk mitigating
strategies, thus causing
adverse supply chain
consequences”
• Disruption as
possibility and effects
of risks in supply
chains (e.g., demand
volatility, operational
risks, human risks,
market risks, political
risks etc.)
• Unclear level of
definition
•  Literature review • Identify an  agenda for
future research and
provide working
definitions of supply chain
vulnerability and risk
management based on  the
extant literature
• Resilience not
defined or discussed
• No operational
measures for resilience
• Multi-level risk
sources: firm, supply
network, &
environmental
•  Qualitative (based on
semi-structured
interviews)
Christopher and Peck
(2004)
• Disruption as “an
exposure to serious
disturbance”
• No operational
measures for
disruption
• Network-level
definition
•  Conceptual •  Propose four
principles (capabilities)
to create a  resilient
supply chain: build-in
resilience when
designing a supply
chain, collaboration
across corporate
entities, agility, and
risk awareness culture
• Resilience as the
ability of a supply chain
to  return to  its original
state or move to a new,
more desirable state
after being disturbed
• Resilience as four
mixed-level
capabilities: supply
chain (re)engineering,
agility, collaboration,
and risk awareness
culture
• Unclear level of
analysis
•  Qualitative
Sheffi and Rice (2005) • Disruption not
defined.
• No operational
measures for
disruption
• Node-level definition • Qualitative • Classify disruptions into
random events or
intentional disruption
•  Resilience as the
ability of a  company to
bounce back from a
disruption and can be
achieved by  either
creating redundancy or
increasing flexibility
• Resilience as
competitive position,
supply chain
responsiveness
• Network-level
analysis
•  Interviews •  Propose a vulnerability
framework and illustrate
how to  make use of it to
identify potential
disruptions
•  Firm-level resilience
depends on
network-level
responsiveness
• Suggest creating
redundancy and increasing
flexibility as ways to  build
in resilience in a  supply
chain.
Tang (2006) • Disruption not
formally defined but
just referred to as a
major factor that has
long-term negative
effects on  a  firm’s
financial performance
• N.A. (operational
measures for
disruption or resilience
not discussed)
• Unclear level of
definition
•  Conceptual •  Certain “robust” supply
chain strategies are
presented that are
characterized as
cost-effective and
time-efficient, including
postponement, strategic
stock, flexible supply base,
make-and-buy, economic
supply incentives, flexible
transportation, revenue
management, dynamic
assortment planning, silent
product rollover
•  Resilience not
formally defined, but
just  referred to as a
situation where a  firm
can  deploy the
contingency plans
efficiently/effectively
when facing a
disruption.
• Unclear level of
analysis
•  Qualitative (based on
industry anecdotes)
Craighead et al. (2007) • Disruption as
unplanned and
unanticipated events
that disrupt the normal
flow of goods and
materials within a
supply chain (adapted
from Kleindorfer and
Saad, 2005, Stauffer,
2003,  and Svensson,
2000)
• Disruption as the
number of nodes in a
supply network whose
ability to  ship and/or
receive goods and
materials (i.e., both
outbound and inbound
flow) has been
hampered
• Node-level definition • Qualitative •  Six propositions to
prescribe relations
among supply network
properties, where
severity of supply chain
disruption is viewed as
a function of supply
chain density, supply
chain complexity and
node criticality
•  Resilience not
defined, but referred to
Sheffi & Rice (2005).
• No operational
measures for resilience
• Unclear level of
analysis: network-level
of analysis often
implied
•  Multi-source,
multi-method
approach: single case
study, structured
interview with 9 firms,
focus groups via critical
incident technique
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Table  1 (Continued)
Referencesa Definition Level of definition and
analysis
Methods/nature of
study
Main  findings
Conceptual definition Operational measuresb
Wu et al. (2007) • Disruption as
unexpected events
occurring in a supply
chain
•  N.A.  (operational
measures for
disruption or resilience
not  discussed)
• Node-level definition
(implied)
•  Analytical • Present a  network-based
approach to model supply
chain systems to  determine
how changes/disruptions
affect supply chains and
how far the effects
propagate in supply chains
•  Resilience not
defined or discussed
• Network-level
analysis (implied)
•  Disruption Analysis
Network by  using Petri
net-based modeling
approach
• The network approach
also embeds
decision-making logic into
the network
Longo and Oren (2008) • Disruption not
formally defined but
just referred to as
various firm-level
disruptive events such
as  strike
•  N.A.  (operational
measures for
disruption or resilience
not  discussed)
• Supply chain- or
network-level
definition
• Qualitative • Suggest four-stages
supply chain resilience
improvement scheme
from a  change
management
perspective: (1)
identify strategic
business decisions and
effects of each decision
on supply chain
vulnerability; (2)
identify actual
guidelines; (3)
categorize risks at  each
level; (4) map  out a
change process
•  Resilience as a
property that allows a
supply chain to  react to
internal/external
risks/vulnerabilities,
quickly recovering an
equilibrium state
capable of guarantying
high perfor-
mance/efficiency.
• Unclear level of
analysis
• Literature review
Kovács and Tatham
(2009)
• Disruption defined as
large-scale
unpredictable events
and a  type of supply
chain risks, different
from operational
vulnerabilities
• N.A.  (operational
measures for
disruption or resilience
not  discussed)
• Unclear level of
definition
• Conceptual • Use resource-based view
(RBV) as the theoretical
lens
•  Supply chain risks
consider all kinds of
events from
operational
vulnerabilities to
operational
catastrophes
disruptions.
•  Level of analysis:
ambiguous but
network-level implied
•  Literature review • Focus on how
configurations of
military vs.
humanitarian
organizations in their
dormant state to
determine capabilities
needed to  respond to
large-scale disruptions•  Resilience not
discussed.
Ponomarov and
Holcomb (2009)
• Disruption not
formally defined but
sources of disruptions
are discussed
•  No operational
measures for
disruption.
• Network-level
definition
• Qualitative • Review the
“resilience” concept
from the ecological,
psychological,
organizational, as well
as emerging
interdisciplinary
research streams,
including emergency
management and
sustainable
development
perspective, and supply
chain risk management
perspective
•  Resilience as the
adaptive capability of a
supply chain to
prepare for unexpected
events, react to
disruptions, and
recover from them by
maintaining continuity
of operations and
control over structure
and function
•  Resilience as logistics
capability
•  Unclear level of
analysis
• Literature review
Ellis et al. (2010) • Disruption as
unforeseen events that
interfere with the
normal flow  of goods
and/or materials
within a  supply chain
[adapted from
Craighead et al., 2007]
• Disruption as the
overall disruption risk
including the
probability &
magnitude of
disruption
• Network-level
definition
• Empirical • Examine the effects of
probability and
magnitude of
disruptions on  overall
perceived supply
disruption risk, which
in turn affects buyers’
search for alternative
suppliers•  Resilience not
discussed.
• No operational
measures for resilience
• Unclear level of
analysis
• Survey
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Table 1 (Continued)
Referencesa Definition Level  of definition and
analysis
Methods/nature of
study
Main findings
Conceptual definition Operational measuresb
Wagner and Neshat
(2010)
• Disruption as “the
trigger that leads to the
occurrence of risk” (p.
122)
• Not  operational
measures for disruption
discussed; but instead,
supply chain
vulnerability drivers
categorized into demand
side, supply side, and
supply chain structure
• Unclear level of
definition
•  Empirical •  Propose a SCVI
(supply chain
vulnerability index)
metric that can be used
to assess the
vulnerability of supply
chains and compare
vulnerabilities of
supply chains across
industries
•  A related concept,
“vulnerability” is
discussed
•  No operational
measures for resilience
• Level of analysis:
multiple & mixed (a
firm, supply chain,
industry, and entire
economy)
•  Survey
•  Resilience not
discussed
Jüttner and Maklan
(2011)
• Disruptions “imply a
certain level of
turbulence [Hamel and
Valikangas, 2003] and
uncertainty in the supply
chain [van der Vorst and
Beulens, 2002]” (p. 247)
• No operational
measures for disruption
• Network-level
definition
• Qualitative •  Suggest that supply
chain risk and
knowledge
management enhance
resilience by improving
flexibility, visibility,
velocity and
collaboration
capabilities at the
supply chain/network
level
•  Resilience defined by
flexibility, velocity,
visibility, and
collaboration capabilities
(adapted from
Ponomarov and
Holcomb, 2009)
• Resilience measured as
flexibility capability,
velocity capability,
visibility capability, &
collaboration capability
• Network-level
analysis with emphasis
on a focal firm
• Singe case study (a
firm with its three
supply chains)
Nair and Vidal (2011) • Disruption not formally
defined
•  Disruption as random
failure and targeted
attack on network nodes
(firms) for their
inventory levels,
backorders, and total
costs
•  Network-level
definition
• Analytical •  Certain established
network characteristics
(such as average path
length, clustering
coefficient, size of the
largest connected
component) are
associated with the
robustness of supply
networks (to  random
failures/targeted
attacks on demand and
uptime of nodes)
•  Resilience (robustness)
not formally defined
•  Resilience (robustness)
as  multiple network
attributes such as
average path length,
clustering coefficient,
size of the largest
connected component
(LCC), and max. distance
between nodes in  the LCC
•  Firm-level analysis • Simulation
(agent-based
modeling)
Zhao et al. (2011) • Disruptions “affect the
normal operations” (p. 1)
and are either random or
targeted
• No operational
measures for disruption
• Network-level
definition
• Analytical • Suggest centrality as a
measure for a  node’s
importance.
•  Resilience as the
ability to  maintain
operations and
connectedness under
the loss of some
structures or functions
(i.e., removal of nodes)
• Resilience as
availability (percentage
of demand nodes that
have access to
supplies), connectivity
(size of the largest
functional
sub-network), and
accessibility (average
and  max. supply path
length)
•  (Logistics)
network-level analysis
•  Simulation •  Rank  network resilience
in  case of random
disruptions:
hierarchy >  scale-free > DLA
(degree and locality-based
attachment) > random
•  Rank  network resilience
in  case of targeted
disruptions:
random >  DLA  >  scale-
free > hierarchy
Johnson et al. (2013) • Disruption not formally
defined
•  No operational
measures for disruption
• Network-level
definition
• Qualitative • Argue that three
dimensions of social capital
enable and facilitate four
formative capabilities of
resilience identified by
Jüttner and Maklan (2011)
• Definition of resilience
borrowed from
Ponomarov and Holcomb
(2009)
• Resilience as
flexibility, velocity,
visibility, collaboration
(borrowed from Jüttner
and Maklan (2011)
• Network-level of
analysis with emphasis
on a focal firm
• Single case study • There social capital
dimensions are structural
(network ties, network
configuration, appropriable
organization), cognitive
(shared codes/language,
shared narratives), and
relational (trust, norms,
obligations, identification)
•  Acknowledge the
dualism of resilience as
the abilities to absorb
shock and the ability to
adapt to  change
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Table  1 (Continued)
Referencesa Definition Level of definition and
analysis
Methods/nature of
study
Main  findings
Conceptual definition Operational measuresb
Scholten et al. (2014) • Borrowed from
Craighead et al. (2007)
definition of disruption
•  No operational
measures for
disruption discussed
• Network level
definition
• Qualitative • Develop an integrated
supply chain resilience
framework by integrating
the five capabilities
(adapted from Christopher
and Peck, 2004)  and a
four-phase disaster
management process
(mitigation, preparedness,
response, and recovery)
•  Resilience in supply
chain context, defined
as  an  ability of supply
chains to recover from
inevitable and
unexpected
disruptions
• Resilience as adaptive
capability to prepare
for, respond to, and
recover from
disruption, including
horizontal and vertical
collaboration, supply
chain (re)engineering,
agility (flexibility), risk
awareness, and
knowledge
management
•  Network level of
analysis with emphasis
on  a  focal firm
• Single case study •  Knowledge
management capability
was  added as a fifth
formative resilience
element
•  Resilience in disaster
management, defined
as  an  ability of an
individual, a
household, a
community, a  country
or a  region to
withstand, adapt, and
quickly recover from
stresses and shocks
a References listed by year of publication.
b Measures used to operationalize supply chain/network disruption or resilience.
several exceptions including Ellis et al., 2010; Wagner and Neshat,
2010). This naturally constrains the research for its scope and
level of analysis. In characterizing and assessing disruption and
resilience, the research has largely overlooked the overall structure
of a supply network, while its importance has been acknowledged
(Christopher and Peck, 2004; Johnson et al., 2013). Consequently,
the findings are insightful, whereas their generalizability and appli-
cability become rather limited. This study aims to  fill the observed
gaps in the extant literature, and to  that end, it is imperative to
understand the basic components of a  supply network structure.
Adopting a network structural perspective, we  propose a  more pre-
cise, formal definition of supply network disruption and resilience,
in which we clarify the nature of these network-level phenomena.
This involves distinguishing between node/arc-level vs.  network-
level disruptions, which in turn helps clarify the definition of supply
network resilience (Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009).
3. Conceptualizing supply network disruption and
resilience
3.1.  Supply network from a graph-theoretic perspective
Graph theory provides a  foundation for conceptualizing a  sup-
ply network1 (Diestel, 1991). Graph theory originated from Leonard
Euler’s famous Seven Bridges of Königsberg problem (Euler, 1741).
The problem was to find a walk through the city that  would cross
each of the seven bridges once and only once (Gross and Yellen,
2006). Euler’s Seven Bridges problem has structural similarities to
moving physical goods across a  supply network. This basic prob-
lem gave rise to  an area of study called graph theory. A graph is  a
collection of nodes connected by  arcs. The concept of a  graph has
been widely applied to various complex networks, which include
1 Throughout the paper, the supply network refers to the physical supply network.
the World Wide Web, power grids, and food webs (Gross and Yellen,
2006; Newman, 2010).
Scholars have begun to  draw on graph theory to understand sup-
ply networks (e.g., Adhitya et al., 2007; Wagner and Neshat, 2010).
Recently some have applied graph theory to  examine supply chain
risks and vulnerabilities (Thun et al., 2011; Wagner and Neshat,
2010),  but there have  been limited applications to theory develop-
ment. For instance, Wagner and Neshat (2010) used graph theory to
come up with a  vulnerability index for individual nodes in  a supply
network. However, they did  not distinguish a  node-level disruption
from a  network-level disruption. Our study draws on graph theory
to understand the difference between a  node/arc-level disruption
and a  network-level disruption.
From a  graph-theoretic perspective, a  supply network can be
characterized as a  collection of nodes (facilities) and arcs con-
necting nodes (transportation). Understanding the basic elements
(i.e.,  nodes and arcs) and their configuration in  a  supply network
thus can help define and more precisely assess supply network
disruption and resilience. Graph theory helps characterize the
underlying structure of a  supply network. As a  result, graph theory
helps to conceptualize supply network disruption and resilience,
and understand how different supply network structures affect
resilience. From this structural perspective, we examine the var-
ious network level metrics and basic supply network structures to
understand network-level supply disruption and resilience.
In  general, graph theory provides an analytical lens to char-
acterize the structural relations among the nodes and arcs in a
network (Gross and Yellen, 2006). Table 2 summarizes the terms
used to  describe a  supply network from a graph-theoretic perspec-
tive. More formally, a graph, denoted as G  = (N, A), consists of two
sets, where the elements in the set N and those in the set A are
called nodes and arcs,  respectively. Each arc in the set A connects
two nodes, called endpoints. A directed graph or digraph is  a  graph
with directed arcs, and each arc has one endpoint designated as
tail and the other as head. This indicates the direction of  flow of
goods in the supply network. Fig.  1 illustrates a digraph of a  supply
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Fig. 1.  Supply network.
network (SN) with the following structural relationships: SN =  (N,
A), where N =  {n1, . . .,  n12} and A =  {a1, . . .,  a16}.
Some basic concepts in  graph theory help understand the struc-
ture of a supply network, which leads to a  definition of supply
network disruption. The degree of a node is  the number of arcs
attached to the node. The in-degree is  the number of arcs whose
head connects to the node, and out-degree the number of arcs whose
tail connects to the node. For instance, in Fig. 1 the node n2 has out-
degree, Out (n2) equal to  1 and in-degree, In (n2)  equal to 2.  That is,
node n2 receives physical supply from nodes n4 and n6 via the arcs
a4 and a3, respectively, and supplies node n1 via arc a2.  A sink node
is a node with zero out-degree but positive in-degree, and a  source
node is a node with zero in-degree but positive out-degree. A  walk
in a digraph is an alternating sequence of nodes and arcs where two
nodes are connected by the tail and head of an arc. In Fig. 1, W = {n11,
a14,  n9, a9,  n6,  a3, n2, a1,  n1}  is  a  walk from n11 (source) to n1 (sink).
The walk W gives one possible path where physical supply could
start at node n11 (source) and traverse the supply network to end
up at node n1 (sink).
This study defines a connected supply network as a digraph, i.e.,
a  network where there exists at least one walk between the source
and the sink nodes2.  In other words, in  a  connected supply network,
it is possible to  get physical supply from the source node(s) to  the
sink node. Consequently, we define connectivity of a  supply network
as the minimum number of nodes and/or arcs that can be  removed
from the network until it becomes disconnected (Gross and Yellen,
2006). For instance, the supply network in Fig. 1 has connectivity
of 2. Disconnecting the network requires removing at least two
elements, such as two arcs (a1 and a2), or one arc (a2) and one node
(n3).
From a supply network perspective, nodes represent facili-
ties such as factories, warehouses, depots, or retail outlets, where
physical goods are stored. Arcs represent conveyance mechanisms
between the nodes, such as air, ship, truck, rail transportation,
where physical goods are  in transit from one node to the next. Each
arc has tail and head to indicate the direction of a  physical flow. The
2 Graph theory defines a connected graph in a slightly different way. In the theory,
a  graph is more generally defined as connected if for every pair of nodes u and v there
is  a walk from u and v  (Gross and Yellen, 1998). In this paper, we  adapt this definition
to  the supply network setting.
in-degree and out-degree give the number of a  given node’s own
suppliers and customers, respectively.
How one characterizes a  supply network depends on whose
perspective you take. Different participants in a  supply network
will have different perspectives of what the network looks like. For
instance, in the automobile industry, the retailers, final assemblers,
and part suppliers all have different perspectives of the supply
network structure. Since everything is ultimately connected to
everything else, a  boundary helps establish the scope of analysis
of supply networks. This study anchors its perspective of a  supply
network on a focal node, such as a  final assembler in  the automo-
bile industry. That is, a supply network is bounded by a  focal firm
and various suppliers connected, either directly or indirectly, to the
focal firm. The focal firm thus becomes the final destination of  the
physical flows, i.e., the sink node in the supply network, and the
source node is  where the raw material originates. Fig. 1 illustrates
a  supply network mapped from the perspective of the sink node
n1,  along with the network boundary, delimited by a  dotted line, in
which there are two  material sources, n11 and n12 and one sink, n1.
3.2. Disruption and resilience in supply networks
3.2.1. Node and arc level disruptions
Disruptions are unplanned and unanticipated events that
prevent the normal materials flow through a supply network
(Svensson, 2000; Craighead et al., 2007). We  argue that a clear dis-
tinction should be made between disruptions at the node/arc level
vs. network level. From a  graph-theoretic perspective, a disruption
at the node/arc level occurs by removing a  node or an arc from the
supply network graph. That is, the node or  the arc becomes inop-
erable and material no longer flows through the node or  along the
arc. Suppose, for example, the arc a14 in  Fig. 2a was  removed from
the network. Namely, the conveyance mechanism between n11 and
n9 had an unplanned outage and no longer operates. From a graph-
theoretic perspective, this induces a  sub-graph (a graph resulting
from removing nodes/arcs from the original graph). Fig. 2b  shows a
sub-graph induced by removing arc a14,  which is  SN =  (N, A) −  a14.
Notice that even without a14,  there still exist walks between
the two  sources (n11 and n12) and the sink node (n1).  For instance,
W1 = {n11,  a15, n10,  a13, n7, a7,  n4, a4, n2, a2,  n1} is  a  walk from n11 to
n1 and W2 =  {n12,  a12,  n8, a8,  n5, a6,  n3, a1, n1} is  a  walk from n12 to n1.
As a  result, even with an arc-level disruption (a14 removed), physi-
cal material can still flow across the network. Fig. 2c shows another
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Fig. 2. Examples of supply disruptions at  arc-, node-, and network-level.
sub-graph made by removing n7, SN = (N, A) − n7. Once n7 becomes
inoperable, then all the arcs attached to  n7 also become inoperable.
Note, however, there still exist walks between the source nodes and
the sink node; specifically W1 =  {n11,  a14,  n9, a9, n6, a3, n2, a1,  n1} is
a walk from n11 to n1 and W2 =  {n12, a12,  n8, a8,  n5, a6, n3, a1, n1} is
a walk from n12 to n1. That is, despite the node-level disruption (n7
removed), material can still flow through the network to the sink
node.
In sum, the above examples illustrate that a  disruption at either
the node or arc level does not necessarily lead to a  network-level
disruption. Interestingly, one may  consider the node n7 critical to
the network since it has the highest degree (in-degree plus out-
degree) in the network. Nonetheless, the disruption of this node
does not disrupt the entire supply network. This poses the question:
What kinds of disruption will lead to a  disruption of the entire supply
network?
3.2.2. Network level disruption and resilience
We  define a supply network disruption as a  situation where there
no longer exists a walk between the source(s) and sink node as a
consequence of a  disruption(s) in nodes or arcs. That is, the supply
network becomes disconnected. However, as in the above exam-
ples, a disruption at a  node (n7)  or arc level (a11) may  not lead
to a disruption at the network level. Fig. 2d  shows another situ-
ation, in which a  disruption occurred with both the node n3 and
the arc a2, SN = (N, A) − n3− a2. As a  consequence of removing the
two elements, n3 and a2, from the supply network, there no longer
exists a walk between the sources and sink node. This illustrates a
situation where node/arc-level disruptions led to  a network-level
disruption. Here, one may  conclude that  a  network-level disruption
involves invariably more than one disruption in  a  node and/or arc.
However, a  disruption of a  single node/single arc could also lead
to  a  disruption of an entire network, which depends on the (rela-
tive) positions of nodes/arcs in  the network and the overall network
structure.
Taken together, the above illustrations point out the need to
differentiate between a node/arc-level disruption and a  network-
level disruption. These illustrations also suggest that the positions,
or structure, of nodes (facilities) and arcs (transportation) in a  sup-
ply network affects its disruption risk. In other words, the overall
configuration of the nodes/arcs in  a network influences the extent
to  which the network stays connected or  resilient. While network
resilience can be defined in a number of ways (Newman, 2010),
in keeping with our definition of a supply network disruption,
we define supply network resilience as a  network-level attribute to
withstand disruptions that  may  be  triggered at the node or arc level.
Consequently, supply network resilience is an emergent structural
property of a  supply network. Therefore, different network struc-
tures will have different degrees of supply network resilience.
4. Supply network structures and resilience
Complex adaptive systems theory provides a  useful theoreti-
cal framework for examining supply network structures (Langton,
1990; Kauffman, 1993). Based on this theory, researchers have
developed analytic frameworks for studying the relations among
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Fig. 3. Four basic supply network structures and the correspondent node degree distributions.
the elements of a  system. In particular, the NK model helps
understand complex systems (Kauffman and Levin, 1987;
Kauffman, 1993). This model focuses on the interactions (or con-
nections) of the elements in  a system and their system-wide
impact. This helps assess the structure of the supply network ele-
ments and the associated broad-scale impact on the overall supply
network. Under the NK model, N refers to the number of elements
(i.e., nodes) in a  system and K refers to the degree of interaction
among the elements (i.e., arcs). For instance, if N =  10 and K  =  2,  then
there are 10 nodes and the average of 2 arcs per node (a total of 20
interactions [arcs]) in  the network.
Scholars have  identified some archetypes that can characterize
basic network structures (Ghemawat and Levinthal, 2008; Rivkin,
2000; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003, 2007; Schilling and Phelps,
2007). They include: random, local, small-world, block-diagonal,
scale-free, preferential-attachment, centralized, dependent, hier-
archical, and diagonal. Rivkin and Siggelkow (2007) applied these
structures to decision-making models, where they hold N × K (or
NK) constant and investigate the effects of different structures
at the same level of complexity. In this study, we adapt these
fundamental structures to represent basic supply network struc-
tures. This analysis focuses on four basic network structures that
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Table  2
Terminologies and definitions for supply network graphs.
Term Definition Denotation/example*
Graph A structure defined by  a  set of
nodes and a  set of arcs which
depicts a  supply network
G = (N,  A)/Fig. 1
Node A point on a  graph, which
represents a  physical location
in a supply network (e.g.
manufacturing facility,
warehouse, retail store)
ni , For i =  1,  . . ., 12
Arc A line that connects to points
in a graph, which represents a
conveyance mechanism
between two physical
locations in a  supply network
(e.g. railroad shipping from a
manufacture to a  warehouse)
ai ,  For i  =  1, . . .,  12
Digraph A graph where all arcs have the
head and tail, which gives a
direction from one node to
another node, whereby
indicating the direction of the
overall network flow. In a
supply network, this
represents the  direction of the
overall flow of physical goods
(e.g. a  railroad ships from the
manufacture to the warehouse)
Fig. 1
Tail One end of the arcs in a
digraph, which indicates where
the physical good originates
See Fig. 1
Head One end of the arcs in a
digraph, which indicates the
destination of physical goods
See Fig. 1
In-degree The number of heads
connected to  a node
In(ni)(e.g., In(n2) = 2)
Out-degree The number of tails connected
to  a  node
Out(ni)(e.g.,
Out(n2) =  1)
Source A node that has a zero
in-degree and positive
out-degree. For example, a raw
material supplier that does not
receive any product, but only
furnishes it
n11 and n12
Sink A node that has a zero
out-degree and positive
in-degree. For example, a
supply network may  end at a
retailer where the physical
good is not shipped anywhere
else, but only receives it
n1
Walk A sequence of alternating
nodes and arcs that originates
from the source node(s) and
ultimately ends at  the  sink
node
W =  {n11 , a15 , n10 , a13 ,
n7 , a7 , n4 , a4 , n2 , a2 , n1}
* Based on a supply network illustrated in Fig. 1.
often occur in real-world supply chain management settings: block-
diagonal, scale-free,  centralized,  and diagonal (see Fig. 3).
We exclude the other six structures from the analysis for the fol-
lowing reasons. The first three – random, local (a simple linear chain
of nodes), and small-world (locally clustered nodes linked via a few
long-distance bridging arcs) – are rarely found in practice. That is,
in a physical supply network setting, it is  hard to  conceive of a
practical situation where the nodes and arcs are determined by ran-
dom assignment (random), where all the nodes and arcs are linearly
aligned to form a single chain or walk (local), or where the network
nodes are arranged into local, distantly separated clusters with only
long, indirect links among them (small-world). Also, preferential-
attachment, dependent, and hierarchical are structurally akin to the
scale-free, centralized, and diagonal, respectively, where the lat-
ter three are viewed as relatively more realistic or basic in terms
of physical supply network. We  did analyze these “kin” structures,
but they did not appreciably differ from the structures we discuss.
Hence, we focus on the four fundamental structures and adapt them
to the supply network context, where material flows from one node
to  another via a  directed arc (digraph). Consequently, the complex-
ity (NK) varies somewhat across these basic structures, but  NK is
kept as close to  the same value as possible. To do this, we  hold
N (number of nodes) constant, and allow small deviations in  K
(number of arcs) to make each structure meaningful to  the sup-
ply network setting. While we try to keep K  similar across the four
network structures, more focus is on making the patterns of con-
nections correspond to  the conceptual definition of each structure.
This helps capture the essential differences of the basic structures.
For instance, given the same N, the block-diagonal (disjointed mul-
tiple high-density clusters) and centralized (network connections
concentrated on just a few nodes) patterns have different by  but
almost the same level of K (see Fig. 3). In addition, the analysis
assumes that every node and arc in  the supply networks has the
same risk (or probability) of disruption, which further helps isolate
the analysis to focus on structural differences.
Consistent with Rivkin and Siggelkow (2007),  N is  set to  12  for
each supply network. Also, each network is assumed to  have a  single
sink and a  single source (Fig.  3), which reflects the most basic supply
network structure and allows for more meaningful comparisons
(Borgatti and Li,  2009). The nodes in the networks use the following
labeling scheme—the sink  node is labeled number 1, the source
node 12,  and the remaining nodes 2 to 11, where a  lower number is
given to a  more downstream node (toward n1)  and a  higher number
to  a more upstream node (toward n12).  The total number of  arcs
ranges from 18 (block-diagonal)  to 29 (centralized) for each of the
basic supply network structures.
A  few extra constraints help make the structures more compa-
rable. First, all nodes except the source and sink  nodes, have both
in-degree and out-degree greater than zero. In the supply network
context, it makes no sense to  examine nodes isolated from the net-
work. Also, we arrange the network connections in  such a  way  that
physical flows always go from upstream to downstream. That is,
there is no such a  case where, for a  given specific node, an incoming
arc comes from a lower-numbered (downstream) node or  an out-
going arc goes to  a  higher-numbered (upstream) node. This further
helps keep the variation in  complexity to a minimum across the
four network structures and facilitate their structural comparisons
on resilience. More detailed descriptions of the four basic supply
network structures along with industry examples follow.
4.1. Basic supply network structures
4.1.1. Block-diagonal
This network structure (Fig. 3a) has clusters of nodes between
the source and sink, where connections occur within clusters but
not  between clusters (Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2007). In general, this
pattern relates to the notion of decomposability (Simon, 1962).
In a  supply network context, this characterizes a  network that
makes modular products (Starr, 1965; Sturgeon, 2002) such as per-
sonal computer (PC), bicycles, and financial services. For  instance,
consider a  typical desktop PC supply chain. It  comprises a  final
assembler and various module suppliers, each of which is fully
responsible for designing and manufacturing the assigned mod-
ule. To do so, each of these suppliers tightly coordinates its own
cluster (block) of parts-suppliers or  sub-assemblers (Baldwin and
Clark, 1997). This basic supply network structure was adapted from
Rivkin and Siggelkow (2007).
4.1.2. Scale-free
The scale-free network pattern captures “the rich-get-richer”
dynamic (Barabási and Albert, 1999). In this network, a  few nodes
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have disproportionately many connections, while most of the other
nodes have only a  few connections. The networking structure
thus resembles the “hub-and-spoke” or  “core-periphery” model
(Borgatti and Everett, 1999). Consequently, the node degree dis-
tribution of the network appears as highly skewed and follows a
power-law or Pareto distribution (Mitzenmacher, 2004). This net-
work structure (Fig. 3b)  is  adapted from Rivkin and Siggelkow
(2007).  In the supply network context, this may  reflect a  situation
where a small group of top-tier suppliers work closely together
and collectively influence supply flows from upstream participants.
This structure mirrors a  keiretsu supply network such as Toyota
city (Markusen, 1996), in which a  small number of “core” firms
(i.e., the focal manufacturer and its highly integrated top suppliers)
jointly control and manage larger numbers of “peripheral” firms
(Gerlach, 1992). The aerospace industry around the Seattle region
offers another example of this network structure (Gray et al., 1996),
where numerous suppliers cluster around a few core firms.
4.1.3. Centralized
The centralized network structure (Fig. 3c)  takes the notion of
highly central nodes to  the extreme (Barabási, 2002). In this struc-
ture, a few nodes connect to  (almost) all other nodes, while the
other nodes link only to the few highly central nodes (Rivkin and
Siggelkow, 2007). Barabási (2002: 103) describes this as a “winner-
take-all” structure. In the supply network setting, this structure
mirrors the situation where the source node directly connects to the
few central nodes as well as to most of the nodes in-between. This
type of supply network occurs in the Prato textile industrial dis-
trict of Tuscany, Italy (Paniccia, 1998); the network revolves around
a  few coordinating agents called “impannatori.” In the Prato tex-
tile industry, a  few central brokers procure raw materials, allocate
orders, give instructions to  a  number of small- to medium-sized
specialist subcontractors (suppliers) in  the region, and even mar-
ket  end-products to customer firms, and consequently exert a lot
of clout in the supply network. Another real-world example comes
from a field study experienced by one of the authors of this study,
where one major automaker employs ‘black-box sourcing’ (Clark
and Fujimoto, 1991) in producing navigation and stereo systems.
That is, the top-tier suppliers assume complete responsibility for
designing, engineering, and producing the entire systems on behalf
of the customer firm, where they plan and manage all the necessary
steps in the development process, even working directly with all
the tertiary-level suppliers of the automaker.
4.1.4. Diagonal
This basic supply structure is  based on the hierarchical inter-
action patterns. In  this structure (Fig. 3d) connections occur
sequentially, where every node takes supply from its lower-tier
nodes, but not from the nodes above it (Rivkin and Siggelkow,
2007). This type of connection pattern embodies a  multi-tiered
supply network structure. In this structure, most of the nodes in
between the source and sink can be partitioned into subsets of
nodes that form tiers, in which the connections primarily occur
across different tiers. Consequently, direct arcs to  the sink node
come only from top-tier nodes. Unlike in  the “pure” hierarchical
structure, however, in  the diagonal structure not every higher-tier
node takes delivery from all the nodes below it. This type of pattern
typically occurs in  military logistics networks (Zhao et al., 2011),
where precedent activities have to  be completed before the next
activities can begin. Also, this may  be the case for some OEMs in
the automotive industry, in which they directly select and manage
their 1st-tier suppliers and devolve on these suppliers the tasks of
selecting and managing larger numbers of their own suppliers (i.e.,
the OEMs’ 2nd-tier suppliers), and then the 1st-tier suppliers follow
suit and so forth (Choi and Hong, 2002).
4.2. Resilience of basic supply networks
We evaluate the four basic supply network structures using
several well-established network analysis metrics that may  have
implications for network resilience. In addition, we  propose a  new
measure of supply network resilience that corresponds to  our def-
inition. The four basic network structures are compared on the
various network metrics for their resilience and we determine
how much the existing network metrics predict supply network
resilience when compared to our measure of supply network
resilience.
4.2.1. Network and resilience metrics
The network literature has identified several metrics for net-
works that may  help understand supply network resilience. These
metrics include: network density, average degree, walks, average
walk length, maximum and minimum walk lengths, connectivity,
betweenness centrality, and network centralization. Network den-
sity refers to a ratio of the number of total existing arcs to the total
number of possible arcs in  the network. The average degree is the
average number of arcs across all the nodes in  a network. The aver-
age,  maximum,  and minimum walk lengths refer to, respectively,
the average length of the identified multiple walks, the length
of the longest walk, and the length of the shortest walk for each
basic supply network. The connectivity is  the minimum number of
nodes and/or arcs that must be removed to  disconnect the network
(Harary, 1969; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Betweenness centrality
is based on the node-level betweenness centrality CB (ni) (Freeman,
1977)  defined as follows:
CB(ni) =
∑
j<k
gjk(ni)
gjk
,
where gjk is the total number of shortest paths between each pair
of nodes, and gjk (ni)  is  the number of those shortest paths that
contain ni.  The each node’s (ni)  betweenness is the probability that
the node lies on shortest paths between other nodes. After calculat-
ing this metric for all the nodes in a network, the average of these
values gives the network-level betweenness centrality. This metric
assesses how often the nodes in  a  network lie on the shortest path
between all combinations of pairs of other nodes in the network.
The centralization (C)  for each network is  calculated using a  def-
inition for degree-based network centralization (Freeman, 1979):
C =
∑g
i=1 [CD (n
∗)− CD (ni)]
max
∑g
i=1 [CD (n
∗)− CD (ni)]
,
where CD (ni)  is  node-level degree centrality, and CD (n
*) is  the
maximum value in  the network.
Finally, we use a simulation model to compute the supply net-
work resilience. Recall, a  supply network disruption occurs when the
network no longer has a  walk from the source to  the sink node due
to disruptions of nodes and arcs. Thus, to calculate supply network
resilience, we estimate the likelihood that there exists at least one
walk between the source and sink nodes with random removal of
nodes and/or arcs in-between the two endpoints. That is,  each sim-
ulation run determines if a  network disruption occurs in  the face of
node/arc disruptions. More specifically, for each basic supply net-
work, we  calculated a  ratio of the total number of combinations
of node/arc removals that do not lead to  a disruption of the net-
work over the total number of possible combinations of  node/arc
removals (as determined by the total number of the given simu-
lation runs), which may  or may  not lead to  a  network disruption.
Formally,
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Table  3
Network metrics and resilience for four basic supply network structures.
Network metrics Block-diagonal Scale-free Centralized Diagonal
Node/arcs 12/18 12/25 12/29 12/25
Network density .14 .19 .22 .19
Average degree 1.50 2.08 2.42 2.08
Resilience .11 .30 .16 .13
Walks 8 19 27 21
Average walk length 6.5 6.89 5.44 8.62
Max. walk length 9 11 7 13
Min. walk length 5 3 3 5
Connectivity 3 4 2 3
Betweenness centrality 1.33 1.67 .75 2.58
Centralization (%) 10.91 52.73 67.27 30.91
Supply network resilience
=
total number of node/arc disruptions, which
does not result in a supply network disruption
total number of node/arc disruptions
We  exclude the source and sink node in  this calculation because
this would automatically lead to a  disruption, and because our focus
is on understanding how the structure of relationships among the
components in between the source and sink affects resilience at
the network level. Nonetheless, including the two endpoints in  the
analysis would not change the metric too much even for moderately
sized networks (such as ones under consideration in this study).
To assess this metric for the four basic network structures, we
develop a simulation model using visual basic. In each simulation
run, we randomly remove each of the nodes and arcs (between the
source and sink) or their combinations with equal probability of
failure. Then we  determine if there exists at least a walk from the
source to the sink node (i.e., the network was not  disrupted). We
ran this process with four different sample sizes (i.e., numbers of
iteration) of 5000, 10,000, 15,000, and 30,000 times and then, for
each sample size, computed the total number of times when the
network was not disrupted over the total number of simulation
runs (5000, 10,000, 15,000, or  30,000). This gives an estimate of the
supply network resilience for each of the four basic supply network
structures. The analysis gave very consistent results across the four
different iterations of sample sizes. Table 3 reports the levels of
supply network resilience based on 30,000 simulation runs, which
is accurate to at least two decimal places (see authors for details of
the visual basic software and simulation model).
For the analysis, we constructed a binary adjacency matrix or
sociomatrix (Wasserman and Faust, 1994)  for each basic network.
The matrices were inputs to  a  simulation model that computes
supply network resilience and the UCINET 6 social network soft-
ware that analyzes the network data for the other network metrics
(Borgatti et al., 2002). Table 3 gives these various metrics for the
four supply network structures.
4.2.2. Comparisons of supply networks on resilience
The basic supply structures show different scores on the met-
rics, including the supply network resilience. Table 3 shows that
the scale-free network structure has by far the highest resilience
(.30), much higher than the centralized structure (.16), the next
highest. Therefore, the results help show how well each of the net-
work metrics can predict resilience. First, one might assume that
a denser network (i.e., higher number of network arcs) tends to
be more resilient. However, in  terms of network density and aver-
age degree, the centralized structure has the highest values, due to
its  slightly higher total numbers of arcs. Also, intuition might sug-
gest that more walks from the source to the sink would result in
higher network resilience. Table 3 shows that the centralized struc-
ture again has the most walks (27), but it is  not the most resilient.
The diagonal structure has the second most walks (21), but with an
even lower resilience score (.13). The average, maximum, and min-
imum walk lengths of each structure also did  not predict network
resilience. On  these metrics, the diagonal structure has the highest
scores.
The network-level metrics of betweenness centrality and central-
ization also did  not correlate with resilience. One might assume that
the more often the nodes bridge other nodes in a network or the
more concentrated the network connections around a  few nodes
in a network, the more resilient the supply network will be to ran-
dom failures. However, diagonal structure scores highest on the
betweenness centrality metric but second lowest on resilience. The
centralized structure scores highest on centralization, but again is
not  the most resilient. The connectivity metric appears to  be more
predictive of network resilience when compared with the other
metrics. The scale-free structure has the highest connectivity (4).
However, the centralized structure has the lowest connectivity (2),
albeit the second most resilient. Further, the diagonal and block-
diagonal structures tie for the connectivity at 3, while the former
is relatively more resilient. This metric cannot distinguish among
the three less resilient network structures. We  also examined other
network archetypes (after structural adaptations to the supply net-
work context) and found similar results.
Taken together, the above results indicate that well estab-
lished network metrics do  not consistently nor reliably predict
network resilience. Interestingly, denser or merely more complex
networks do not necessarily have  higher resilience. This implies
that from a  network perspective, redundancy may not  always lead
to  higher resilience, which contradicts some of the conventional
views on supply network resilience (see Sheffi, 2005). This also
conflicts some research on supply network resilience that argues
for the association between the well-established network metrics
and resilience (e.g., Nair and Vidal, 2011). Overall, these results
suggest that  structure plays a significant role in supply network
resilience. Researchers thus need to carefully consider their choices
of metrics to assess resiliency. Taken-for-granted assumptions (e.g.,
that redundancy leads to higher resilience) may  lead to  an erro-
neous conclusion (e.g., that  higher average degree will have higher
resilience). Rather, there may  be  a  non-linear relation between the
existing metrics and resilience, which is  contingent on network
structure. Scholars conducting empirical research on supply net-
work resilience need to  be careful about how they conceptualize
and use metrics. As such, network resilience represents an under-
examined network property, and merits further research. As a  step
in  this direction, we advance some propositions that  link supply
network structure to resilience.
5. Proposition development
The above comparisons demonstrate that network structure
affects network resilience. A  network-level disruption occurs with
the removal of all possible walks between the source and sink.
Removing nodes or arcs from a  network potentially changes the
number of walks, which may  ultimately disrupt the entire net-
work (Newman, 2003). Assuming that every node (facility) and arc
(transportation) in a  supply network has equal risk of failure, dif-
ferent configurations of the nodes and arcs will lead to  different
chances of reducing the number of walks in  the face of  node/arc
disruptions, which determines the likelihood of network disrup-
tion.
In the literature on  complex networks, many scholars have
advocated examining network resilience from a  structural perspec-
tive. Albert et al. (1999) studied the effect of node deletion on
network resilience in the Internet and the World Wide Web. The
same authors studied the attack- tolerance of complex networks
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(Albert et al., 2000), and found that networks with a high level of
centrality tend to be  more robust to  random removal of nodes/arcs.
The social-ecological systems literature has also examined how
network structure (of humans, communities, and organizations)
affects an ability to adapt and withstand disruptions. For instance,
Holme et al. (2002) studied vulnerability (measured by the average
inverse shortest path length) of various virtual social networks with
removal of both nodes and arcs. Adger et al. (2005),  from a  structural
perspective, investigated social-ecological systems for their vulner-
ability to disasters and suggested that a  multi-level structure can
better cope with unexpected external shocks. The previous studies
suggest that network structural properties, particularly connect-
edness and centrality, affect the resilience of complex networks
(Albert et al., 2000; Dunne et al., 2004; Janssen et al., 2006). As
a  result, this study builds upon prior research by  examining the
network structure effect on supply disruption and resilience.
Our analysis provides further support for the significant link
between network structure and network resilience, and supports
this argument in the context of supply network. Each of the four
structures reflects the unique archetype of supply network con-
figuration. While they appear different from each other in form
(Fig. 3), the four structures are analytically comparable. They were
all adapted from the existing archetypes (in Rivkin and Siggelkow,
2007) to the supply network setting, so that they have similar levels
of complexity (NK). However, the analysis demonstrates that  these
basic supply structures have different levels of network resilience.
For instance, Table 3 shows that the scale-free structure has the
highest resilience, but has relatively low scores on the density, aver-
age degree, number of walks, betweenness centrality, and network
centralization metrics. We  need to note that the number of arcs
(i.e., inter-firm connections) itself may  not be a  reliable predictor of
resilience, which contradicts some of the conventional views that
promote redundancy in  network elements to  increase resilience
(Sheffi, 2005). Apparently, there exist structural differences across
the basic supply networks, that  is, in  the way that  the nodes and arcs
are configured in the network, which greatly affects the network
disruption risk and resilience.
If we can observe much smaller differences in  resilience
between networks of similar structure than between dissimilar
structures, this should further support the argument. In a  post-
hoc analysis, we adapt the preferential-attachment, dependent, and
hierarchical structures based on Rivkin and Siggelkow (2007) and
compare their resilience to their structural cousins, i.e., scale-free,
centralized, and diagonal, respectively3. While we  still find a dif-
ference in resilience level between each pair of structural cousins,
the spread in  each pair is  much smaller compared with the dif-
ferences between dissimilar structures. These observations thus
lend support for our  argument that the supply network structure
significantly affects the degree of network resilience.
Proposition 1  (P1). Ceteris paribus, the structure of a supply net-
work affects the resilience of the supply network.
What specific structural characteristic(s) affect the differences
in  resilience among the supply networks? The analysis and observa-
tions suggest that the overall arrangement of the nodes and arcs in
a  supply network influences the likelihood of network disruption.
Namely, degree distribution of a  supply network plays a  critical role
in determining its resilience.
The degree distribution (degree of a  node equals the number of
arcs attached to  it) reflects the overall pattern of connectedness in
a  network (Strogatz, 2001). There are a  variety of different ways in
which nodes or arcs can be removed from a network. We assume,
arguably, in a supply network, a  node or arc disruption randomly
3 The additional analysis results are available upon request.
Many nodes with few arcs 
Rank-order of nodes by their k arcs 
A few nodes with man y arcs 
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f a
rc
s 
(k)
 
Fig. 4. Power-law distribution.
occurs. That is, the individual nodes and arcs have approximately
the same level of failure risk. Given such random failure nature of
the network elements, configuring them in such a  way that each
of them carries the same weight (i.e., the same degree) in  terms of
connecting the supply network may  not help mitigate supply dis-
ruption risk. Failure of any node (and subsequently a  given number
of arcs attached to it) will not  only remove these elements from
the network, but also cripple as many other nodes of the same
importance by reducing their degree and removing paths between
them, which can significantly disturb the material flows and dis-
rupt the whole network. Drawing on complex systems theory, we
propose that a  network exhibit unique properties to failure when
its (node) degree distribution follows a power-law (Newman, 2010).
Network structures that follow a power-law feature skewed degree
distributions (see Fig. 4).
The power-law distribution, sometimes called scale-free
(Barabási and Albert, 1999)  or Pareto distribution (Newman, 2005),
reflects a  situation where a few nodes in  a network have dispropor-
tionately high degree and many of the other nodes have low degree.
This form of degree distribution has been recognized as a unique
structural feature of many attack-tolerant complex networks. Albert
et al. (2000) observe that some organic networks such as the Inter-
net and the World Wide Web  follow a  power-law in their degree
distributions. Furthermore, they found that the average path  length
between pairs of nodes in those networks was almost unaffected by
random removal of nodes. Drawing on the same idea, Broder et al.
(2000) argued that to  destroy the connectedness in  the World Wide
Web, one would need to  remove all nodes with degree greater than
five. Given the highly skewed degree distribution of the Web, only
a small proportion of all nodes have degree greater than five. These
studies suggest that a  skewed degree distribution can enhance the
resilience of complex networks, especially to  random shocks.
In networks that follow a  power-law distribution, most of the
nodes have low degree and therefore lie on few paths between
others. Consequently, average path length would increase only
marginally, if not at all, with random removal of node/arc from the
network. In other words, random node/arc removal rarely affects
the overall connectedness of a  network with this structure. This
has implications for reducing supply network disruptions. From
the perspective of the focal firm of a  supply network (e.g., OEMs
in the automotive industry), if its key suppliers are closely con-
nected to one another to  the point where they even share preferred
tertiary-level or raw-material suppliers, it is  equivalent to the cre-
ation of potential alternative walks, which can make the supply
system fairly robust to random failures that may  occur even “deep
in  the supply network.” Toyota supply network provides a case in
point in  the Aisin fire case (Nishiguchi and Beaudet, 1998). A 1997
fire at a  factory of Aisin Seiki, the main supplier of the brake valves to
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Toyota, threatened to halt Toyota’s operations for weeks. However,
the abrupt node-level failure, instead of leading to a  network-level
disaster, was averted due to the existence of alternative walks in
the network. Toyota’s top-tier suppliers shared the information and
management of the upstream side of the network, which enabled
them to set up alternative production capabilities outside of Aisin,
and the whole process was  orchestrated with very limited direct
control from Toyota. Therefore, everything else being equal, a  sup-
ply network structure with node degree distribution conforming
to a power-law becomes less vulnerable to network-level disrup-
tions, compared to networks with the distribution deviating from
a power-law (Albert et al., 2000).
Our theoretical and computational analyses of the basic network
structures support this argument. Fig.  3,  panels e–h illustrates this
point in the node-degree histogram plots for the four basic supply
network structures. The horizontal axis on each histogram rank-
orders 12 nodes by degree, and the vertical axis denote the node
degree. Comparisons of the histograms show that the most resilient
supply network, scale-free, most closely follows a  power-law dis-
tribution. By definition, most of the nodes in the network have low
degree, while just a  few nodes have fairly high degree, which results
in a long tail to the right of the histogram (Barabási, 2005). Observ-
ing the histograms, we  can also notice that, next to  the scale-free, the
centralized structure appears to resemble a  power-law pattern for
its degree distribution. It is  not  surprising, thus, to  see the structure
having the second highest resilience level. Nonetheless, the central-
ized structure scores much lower (.16), compared to  the scale-free
(.30). The centralized pattern, as noted earlier, takes the notion of
highly central nodes to the extreme, and so there are virtually no
connections among the lower-degree nodes. This can translate into
limited connectedness in the network (i.e., limited alternative paths
to the central nodes as well as to the sink). Hence, the structure,
despite its slightly more arcs (29) than scale-free (25), shows much
lower resilience. Consequently, the degree distribution of a  supply
network influences its resilience to a  greater extent, compared with
other network-level metrics.
Proposition 2 (P2). The more closely a  supply network follows
a power-law for the degree distribution of the nodes, the more
resilient the supply network will become.
6.  Discussion and conclusion
Scholars have begun to study supply network disruption and
resilience, but largely at the node level (Craighead et al., 2007).
However, this can be misleading when looking at disruptions from a
network perspective. Complexity theory argues that system behav-
ior emerges from the actions or  interactions of the components of
a system. This paper develops a  network perspective of disruptions
and resilience to show how disruptions and resilience emerge from
the network components. A network view alters how we manage
and conduct research on supply network disruptions. Fig.  2 illus-
trates the importance of understanding the supply network as a
whole. By looking at individual nodes in Fig. 2, some would con-
sider node n7 to be the most critical node due to its central location
and high degree (Craighead et al., 2007). However, disrupting this
node does not disrupt the network (see Fig. 2c). Without an under-
standing of the structure of the network, managers may  unwittingly
allocate resources only to increase the resilience of the wrong nodes
in the network. Managers (and scholars) may  be misled by look-
ing at only the nodes of a  supply network and not considering the
overall structure.
This study makes the following contributions to the literature.
First, it provides a formal definition of a supply network dis-
ruption by differentiating it from disruptions of nodes and arcs.
Existing definitions of supply network disruption do not clearly
specify the levels of effect and analysis, although node-level dis-
ruptions do not invariably lead to  a  disruption of a  network.
Our definition, however, distinguishes between node/arc-level vs.
network-level disruptions. This distinction helps examine disrup-
tions at the supply network level and highlight the importance of
taking a  network perspective to understand resilience. From this
perspective, resilience at the node level is  different than that at
the network level, which affects how we  study and manage sup-
ply network resilience. Second, we investigate the resilience of
four basic supply network structures. These structures map onto
prototypes of real-world supply networks. This gives fundamen-
tal insight into the effect of different supply network structures on
resilience. Third, we  develop a metric for supply network resilience
that corresponds to our definition of supply network disruption,
and compare it to some conventional network metrics. The stan-
dard network metrics do not  reliably distinguish among different
supply networks on resilience. Consequently, scholars should care-
fully define metrics when evaluating supply network resilience. For
instance, Craighead et al. (2007) defines the term node criticality
in terms of the importance of each node when viewed in isola-
tion within the network. From a  network perspective, our research
shows that node criticality needs to  be understood in  terms of the
overall network structure.
6.1. Implications for research
Failure to  clarify the level of analysis in supply network dis-
ruptions can be problematic in a couple of ways. First, it risks
committing the ecological fallacy (over-generalizing findings at
a higher level to a lower level) or the atomistic fallacy (over-
generalizing findings at a  lower level to a  higher level), both of
which could lead to misleading conclusions. For instance, creating
redundancy in nodes (i.e., redundant facilities) or arcs (i.e., alternate
shipping channels) in the network may  have no effect on over-
all resilience of the network. Although prior research (e.g., Sheffi
and Rice, 2005)  advocates redundancy as a  strategy for mitigat-
ing supply network disruptions, the potential benefits need to be
understood in  the context of the whole supply network. Failure
to clarify the level of analysis in  prior research can diminish the
applicability of the findings. By drawing on graph theory and for-
mally defining a supply network in  terms of the structural elements
(i.e.,  nodes and arcs), we develop a  more precise definition that
differentiates a  supply network disruption from a node/arc-level
disruption, which clarifies the level of analysis and will increase
the applicability of the findings.
Second, research on supply network resilience has not fully
incorporated the role of network structure. Many studies (except
for Sheffi, 2007 [cf. The Resilient Enterprise]) have approached the
issue at an individual firm level, and do not fully consider the struc-
ture of supply networks. But, we show that network resilience is
contingent on network structure. Managing supply disruptions by
focusing on node-level risks gives only incomplete solutions for
improving resilience. For  example, some prior studies considered
how facility location (node-level) decisions can improve supply
chain resilience (Hale and Moberg, 2005; Reid and Sanders, 2010).
However, a  facility location decision can alter the overall structure
of the supply network. Without incorporating the broader network
implications, such node-level planning and decisions may  be sub-
optimal.
This study also shows that established network analytic metrics
do not precisely predict the resilience of supply networks. Although
some researchers have argued, for instance, that high-degree nodes
(Craighead et al., 2007)  and short average path length (Nair and
Vidal, 2011) play critical roles in network disruption, our  analysis
shows that node failure and average walk length are not necessarily
related with a  network disruption. Further, the results (in Table 3)
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show that there exist nonlinear relations between the conventional
network metrics and the proposed network resilience metric. For
instance, the centralized structure scores highest on the network
density metric, but it is  not the most resilient. Similarly, the diago-
nal structure scores highest on the betweenness centrality metric,
but it is also not the most resilient. However, the scale-free has the
highest level of resilience when compared to the other structures.
Apparently, network resilience is a  distinct property of a supply
network, meriting further research.
In this regard, the concept of (structural) complexity in  a
network context merits further consideration. The literature on
complex networks poses two competing arguments about the rela-
tion between complexity and resilience. Some studies argue for a
positive relationship between more complex networks (i.e., greater
network density) and resilience (Albert et al., 2000; Janssen et al.,
2006), while others argue the opposite since “a complex supply
chain would be  more likely to  be severe than the same. .  . disrup-
tion occurring within a relatively less complex” supply network
(Craighead et al., 2007: 141). The above nonlinear relationship sug-
gests that either argument is only partially true-–neither too little
nor too much complexity is  good for network resilience. This obser-
vation points out a need for further research to  uncover optimal
answers for increasing network resilience.
Finally, this study also has implications for empirical research.
For instance, the existing empirical research on supply disrup-
tions/risks has been discussing various capabilities that firms
should develop for greater resilience or robustness, such as agility,
collaboration capabilities, risk awareness (Christopher and Peck,
2004), production flexibility (Sheffi and Rice, 2005), and supply
visibility/velocity (Jüttner and Maklan, 2011). However, do  they
represent node/arc-level or network-level capabilities? This study
points out that empirical research should clarify the level at which
it  discusses resilience capabilities, because increases in node- or
arc-level capabilities may  not lead to  an increase in network-level
resilience. Acknowledging that much of the research has focused
more on node/arc-level capabilities, now research needs to go
beyond the local level to identify and suggest more of network-level
capabilities for system-wide resilience.
6.2. Implications for practice
This study sheds light on how to manage supply network dis-
ruptions. Sheffi (2007) notes, “one of the most straightforward
methods for creating resilience is  building redundancy” (p. 275).
However, this study shows that increasing redundancy by adding
extra nodes or arcs may  not improve the resilience of the network.
Individual suppliers’ relative positions and how they are linked
up in the network should be given more careful consideration.
Managers can improve the resilience of the supply network by man-
aging network structure. This may  entail mapping out the structure
of the supply network to see if it follows a scale-free or Pareto dis-
tribution. As a practical matter, managers can apply the following
rule of thumb, “Do 20%  of the facilities (nodes) have transporta-
tion connections (arcs) with 80% of the other facilities (nodes) in
the network?” If so, the network structure should lead to higher
resilience since it follows the power-law distribution. Second, this
research has implications for supplier selection and management
practices. Often, companies focus on the internal qualities or capa-
bilities when evaluating new and existing suppliers. However, this
study suggests taking a  broader view. A given supplier’s role in net-
work resilience depends, in part, on its position in  the network.
Fig. 2c shows that the most-connected supplier in the network may
not be the most critical factor in terms of disrupting the network,
which is contrary to  conventional wisdom. Managers would need
to identify all the linkages their individual suppliers have with the
others in the supply network to precisely assess their impact on
network resilience. Third, firms may  need to  update their method
for classifying suppliers. The traditional focus in  supplier classifica-
tion has been on the importance of suppliers in their direct impact
on the focal firm’s profit and risk position (e.g., Kraljic, 1983). Thus,
the immediate, top-tier suppliers are typical classification objects.
However, our paper suggests a new category of potentially crit-
ical suppliers, different from the traditional “strategic” suppliers.
This new category of suppliers becomes strategically important due
to  their positions and how they are linked up in the broader net-
work. They serve as the “linchpin” of the supply network, and when
removed, can disrupt the entire network.
6.3. Limitations and future research
This research has some conceptual and analytical limitations,
which suggest avenues for future research. Conceptually, first we
treat every node and arc as having equal probability of failure. In
other words, in our theory and analysis, we  did  not consider vary-
ing importance of the nodes and arcs in  the network, which may
be less realistic. However, this helps isolate the analysis to network
structural differences. In practice, the probably of failure may  vary
across different nodes and arcs in the supply network. Assigning
different probabilities of failure for the elements in a supply net-
work may  have implications for network disruption and resilience.
Also, in  this paper, for the purpose of keeping the variation of  com-
plexity to a  minimum, we imposed some constraints on our models,
which might result in some practically important variables being
excluded from our  analysis. For instance, our  analysis did not  take
into account the possible differential effects of different lead times
due to different node-level (i.e., facilities) capabilities or different
lengths of the arcs (i.e., transportation) in  the network. Individual
differences in lead-time at the nodes and along the arcs or  collective
differences along various walks in the network should determine
the magnitude of a network-level disruption.
Further, this study takes a more static approach to supply net-
work disruption. That is, in  the analysis once a node or an arc is
removed from a supply network, its function is removed altogether
excluding the possibility of a substitution for this function. In prac-
tice, a  focal firm may  include by design a  substitution capability
into the supply system to reduce disruption risk. Future research
may  incorporate this into its research model to get more realistic
results. However, this study has implications for dynamics in sup-
ply disruption and resilience. Every supply network should evolve
in its structure over time toward more resilient structure. A sup-
ply network will become more resilient to node/arc disruptions
if its structure follows a  power-law pattern in  the degree distri-
bution. Finally, the size of the supply networks considered in this
study might limit the reliability or generalizability of  our findings.
To ensure the validity of the basic supply networks, we  adapted the
network archetypes mapped in Rivkin and Siggelkow (2007),  and as
a  result, the number of nodes in each basic supply network was set
to 12. While this enabled meaningful comparisons of basic network
archetypes, scaling up the network size would reflect greater struc-
tural complexity inherent in real-world supply networks. Future
studies are encouraged to relax the constraints imposed in this
research to further capture complexities and challenges of  man-
aging network disruption and resilience.
6.4. Conclusion
The emerging literature on supply network disruption and
resilience has been confusing with respect to the conceptual-
ization and level of analysis. We conceptualized supply network
disruption and resilience from the network structural perspec-
tive by drawing on graph theory. This approach helps understand
how network-level disruptions emerge from disruptions of the
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components of a  supply network. Further, it clearly helps differ-
entiate a node/arc disruption from a  network disruption, which
has been a point of confusion in  the development of the literature.
This research suggests theoretical and analytical approaches to
understand and evaluate network level disruptions and resilience.
Moreover, we hope that  our summary observations, presented in
the form of propositions, serve as a  stepping-stone that  stimulates
more research to further understand supply network disruption
and resilience.
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